Since the 1980s, China and Brazil became increasingly interconnected, based largely on the production, distribution and consumption of cheap Chinese products. These countries have different cultural and historical attitudes to copied goods and non-regulated economic activities. 
This article then, aims to explain the formation of a global commodity chain from below which united China and Brazil in the 1980s in order to (1) understand how the notion of copies and informal economy are conceived by the Chinese and Brazilian States; and, (2) , to observe how such conceptions are representative of the development models of both countries.
I reach the conclusion that the production of copies, the maintenance of informal work and the personal ties maintained between state agents and the market are perceived in almost diametrically opposing ways by these two countries: Chinese state views such activities as drivers of its development, while Brazilian state interprets them as obstacles.
However, the complexity of this argument is that, despite these different conceptions, the economic and cultural realities of these two countries are quite similar in terms of the role that the non-regulated trade of copies has played in both societies. Besides the structural economic importance of this market, other similarities can be observed, from an anthropological point of view, about the ways it operates in the sphere of everyday life, especially since, in both China and Brazil, a good part of this chain is bolstered by the strength of personal ties.
In this situation characterized by similar economic practices, but distinct understandings of them, Brazilian anthropology is presented with certain challenges. In looking at the Chinese situation, we realize that some conceptual frameworks -such as ideas about informal, illegal and illicit economies -are not always adequate since they were built upon a western dualistic construct, which presupposes that economic practices must be purely formal and controlled according to economic interests.
In this sense, to analyze one part of China's economy from the perspective of informality and piracy, is not only potentially reductionist, but perhaps Orientalist -in a 'Brazilian style' -imposing Western categories on another reality, ignoring the historical and cultural complexity of the phenomenon, which, I argue, cannot be expressed through purely dualistic concepts, such as legal and illegal, formal and informal, licit and illicit. Apart from that, it is important to point out that these categories do not even account for the Brazilian reality, in that they are inspired by the ideals of an impersonal and rational market, which, although incorporated into Brazilian ideological understandings, never took into account the many manifestations of low-budget markets within the country itself. Brazilian economic practices themselves have been shown to be contrary to the notions of a rational, bureaucratic and impersonal market.
My research sought to follow a global commodity chain from start to finish: 
A global commodity chain from below: old roots, new policies
The market for cheap Chinese products has connected China and Brazil, via Paraguay, through international trade routes that were established in the 1980s. Since then, as at no other time in their history, the two countries have become closely interconnected.
In order to understand this process I will adopt here the concept of global commodity chain from below, joining the contemporary studies of global commodity chains (Bestor 2000 (Bestor , 2001 Foster 2005; Freidberg 2004; Geriffi 1999; Hansen 2002; Hughes 2001; Ziegler 2007; etc. ) with Ribeiro's theory about non-hegemonic globalization from below. As Bestor points out:
The structure of a commodity chain-the links, stages, phases, and hands through which a product passes as it is transformed, combined, fabricated, and distributed between ultimate producers and ultimate consumers-is a highly fragmentary and idiosyncratic social formation, itself the product of the often minutely calibrated linkages, the provisioning relationships, that exist between every pair of hands along the way (2001: 80).
Theoretically and methodologically, this approach follows the social life of a given commodity (Appadurai 2006) , such as its design, production, promoting, distribution, sale and, finally, its consumption (Gereffi 1999) . As an anthropologist, I have been interested in understanding the human side of economic exchanges, observing how large-scale processes may be comprehended by social agents in their daily lives.
The singularity of the chain I study is that the actors, commodities and practices need to involve "techniques of illegalit" (Pinheiro-Machado 2011), in other words, their economic activities are only partially regulated by States.
In this way, as an alternative to the notion of "informal economy" Ribeiro proposes the concept of non-hegemonic globalization from below because their activities defy the economic establishment everywhere on the local, regional, national, international and transnational levels. Consequently, they are portrayed as a threat to the establishment and feel the power of political and economic elites who wish to control them. The attitudes states and corporations hold towards them are highly revealing. Most of the time such activities are treated as police matters, as the focus of elaborate repressive action (2006: 19) .
Classifying the market I study as a global commodity chain from below I aim to point out not only that I observe many parts of a singular productive process, but also that I avoid as much as possible dualist classifications such as formal/informal, legal/illegal, economy/non-economy, market/state and so on. From below is not related to social classes of the actors involved in the chain (even despite the fact that many of them are recruited by low-income sectors, especially in Brazil), but is an alternative way of conceiveing a market which is not completely aligned with the principles of the major international organizations of the world system.
Historical roots that united Brazil and China
Although this chain has been formed recently, its genesis dates way back. In China, from 1700 to 1845, the so-called Canton System -through the unique waterways of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province -drove one of the largest and most dynamic port regions in the world, characterized by foreign trade of opium, ceramics and silver. The abundance of ports in the region resulted not only in the outflow of goods, but also of people. Although there was an immense effort on the part of the Qing Empire to regulate this market, contraband and other practices that were not controlled and planned by the government played a powerful role in the economy of that period, opening new markets and port areas (Dyke 2005; Sahlins 2004 ).
According to Dikotter (2007) , China also began to specialize in the mass production of goods by copying foreign products -such as English watches, for example -which aroused fascination among the Chinese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In that period, these products were already being made on the basis of a labor-intensive model, popularizing consumer goods not only in China, but in different countries within the range of the Canton System. The production of these copies was not considered an illegal or marginal activity, but rather an extremely important facet of the economy, not only because it played a role in import substitution and the expansion of domestic industry, but also because the culturally-constructed connotation in relation to copying and imitation held a positive value, as compared to that in the West today.
In the twentieth century, the Canton System and the system for producing copies and other mass consumption products came to an end. During the time China was closed off to the world during the Maoist years, the world capitalist system expanded to Asian countries, transferring factories and technology to countries such as Japan in the 1950s and 60s, and Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 80s, in exchange for cheap labor (Gereffi 1999) .
In 1957, the island of Taiwan, opposed to Mao's revolution, signed diplomatic agreements with Paraguay, which recognized the island as a sovereign country for pragmatic reasons. These agreements primarily served to facili- at the international border. In light of this promising opportunity, the city received a heavy influx of people from Taiwan, which was at its peak in producing goods whose prices were based on a labor-intensive and cheap workforce.
Thus, together with immigrants from other nationalities, one of the world's largest commercial centers was formed in the 1970s for small goods, copies and trinkets, initially under the "Made in Taiwan" label.
In the early 1980s, the Chinese government began to implement reforms arising from economic liberalization, restoring ties with Taiwan. The focus of development was placed on maximizing the old mercantile attributes of the Pearl River Delta and Canton System. Zones, cities and entire coastal areas were opened up, which came to be considered special for production and export. Local industry was encouraged, which rekindled its know-how, especially in the production of copies and household gadgets. Following the model of Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, cheap prices were the result of a mass production model, based on intensive and non-regulated labor practices, put forth as an alternative for remedying poverty in the countryside.
Under this scenario, millions of Chinese went to Guangdong during the economic reform, especially from rural areas, while many Cantonese emigrated from the country, forming one of the most recent waves of the Chinese Diaspora, for the purpose of marketing, worldwide, everything that their country started producing in abundance: copies, trinkets and other products that were marketed for unbeatable prices. Within this context, from the 1980s on, many Cantonese went to Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and joined up with the Taiwanese, forming a Chinese community specialized in selling cheap Chinese goods, thus furnishing mass goods for much of South America.
"Made in Taiwan" gave way to "Made in China".
In the 1980s and 90s, this border trade provided employment opportunities for hundreds of thousands of people in Brazil during the restructuring of the Brazilian democracy and, subsequently, the economic opening of the country. "Made in China" markets multiplied throughout the country, at which time vendors began to make weekly trips to get the latest items that were arriving in the country. Commonplace goods, electronics, cosmetics, ornaments, replicas etc. were available for the first time at affordable prices for different social groups, especially the middle and lower classes.
The rise of "Made in China" goods caused a great change in low-budget Brazilian markets. Until then, street vendors in the large cities sold odds and ends, crafts, fruit and fish. The genesis of these markets is rooted in the rural exodus of freed slaves, tenant farmers and other underprivileged groups in the country (Kovarick 1975 (Kovarick , 2001 Oliveira 2003 , Pesavento 1991 Silva 1971 ). However, this economic activity, although essential for that part of the population which didn't have their slice of the pie in terms of national wealth, has always been classified as something of an excrescence in relation to the country's mainstream development and, therefore, as a target for modernizing and hygienist policies. "Made in China" goods caused markets to take on unprecedented proportions in the urban fabric of large cities, and changed their nature: from local odds and ends to global manufactures.
In downtown Porto Alegre, in particular, street vendors began to sell 
China and Brazil post-TRIPS Era
The 21st Century is characterized by major global transformations that demonstrate a more balanced power structure in the international system. This is the result of the performance of emerging nations such as China and Brazil, which are the 2nd and the 6th largest world economies, respectively, and to- 3 This list put Brazil as a country which deserved to be watched and therefore was not a favorite partner in the circuit of The Generalized System of Preferences, GSP.
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Under Section 301 of the amended Trade Act of 1974 the USTR must by April 30th of each year: «identify (1) those foreign countries that (A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable markets access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, and (2) those foreign countries identified under paragraph (1) "global" set of IPR standards to which most market-oriented countries are held, their development has not followed a linear, 'progressive' path toward homogenization". I argue that Brazil and China diverge in their development strategies. The global commodity chain from below which I studied, now occupies a central role in the development model of both countries -as an enemy or an ally. It does not signify the demise of the global commodity chain that unites Brazil and China from below, but rather a broad process of adaptation, restructuring and changes in flows.
Copies and informal economy supported by personal ties: similar practices, opposing values
Throughout the chain, personal ties take on different nuances, depending on the legitimacy of non-regulated or non-accepted activities. In China, personal ties appear to be in favor of the State, whereas in Brazil, on the contrary, they are deemed to work against the State. The traditional system of the exchange 
China: informal economy as development
In general terms, non-state-regulated activities have played an important role in the history of the country, especially opium smuggling and the maritime piracy of the Canton System, even though control over commercial activities had always been centralized in the hands of the imperial court. The State attempted to stop these activities especially when it lost control of domestic trade during the period preceding the opium war (Bello 2003) .
In China, according to Dikotter (2007) , imitation did not have a negative meaning. The market for copies, in turn -which in the West today is called piracy -has a strong historical link with the Chinese government, being considered a source of development of the arts and the economy.
It can be argued that since the Han Dynasty up until the present, copies have played an important role in the national scheme of things, just as culturally, the Chinese notion of intellectual property and copyright are quite singular: copying represents an avenue for learning, and being copied confers prestige. According to Confucian thoughts, to imitate is the way to apprehend tradition and benevolence. The old models must be incorporated and learnt from a source of authority, as well as transmitted by rituals that venerated the past (Granet 2004; Xia 2000) . Thus, laws are useless when compared to past influences (Alford 1995) . Along China's history, the subjective incorporation of rules was associated with a fragile legal system. Wherever humanity is benevolent, as Confucius suggests, laws are unnecessary. Acting according to correct models of human action (Starr 2010 ) is the norm, since good models are clearer than laws. In this way, some Chinese scholars have argued so far that norms as introspective and unconscious, therefore, written laws are not efficient (Qi 2005; Xia 2000) .
Throughout Chinese history countless paradigmatic events demonstrate the importance of copies for State and its absence of IPR. For example, during the Song Era (618-907), the Emperor Huizong obligated civil servants to copy his own paintings, setting up a formal academy of arts (Gascoigne 2010 ). In the second half of nineteenth century, government promoted a vast campaign for strengthening of national industry, strongly supporting the mass production of copies of European manufactures (Dikotter 2007) .
When China opened up to the world in 1979, it fomented certain economic activities, deemed capable of rapidly developing the country: production of copies, mass production and labor-intensive methods -all of which, to some extent, was a shock to the Western world. "Making money", on the basis of the new national idea dictated by Deng Xiaoping, that "to get rich is glorious", became the emblem of an entrepreneurial lifestyle. According to my entrepreneur informants, there was a tacit social agreement that it was necessary first ro grow and create jobs after which working conditions and the quality of domestic industry could be improved.
Thousands of factories, so-called sweatshops, were opened especially in the province of Guangdong. The vast majority adopted the same work system: minimum wage, dorm rooms and meals for employees in exchange for almost non-stop work behind machines that copied pre-established models. An informant -Shang, a 36 year-old businessman who imports wines from Canada to Shenzhen -has used the famous Deng Xiaoping's sentence
"It doesn't matter if the cat is white or black, so long as its catches rats" to explain
China's boom. When I asked him about piracy, he replied with another ques-
tion: "what is the fastest way to grow? What is the fastest way to generate jobs?"
According to his words, the market for copies is a black cat that nobody finds beautiful, but it is efficient in its final goal. At Luohu shopping center, I daily followed the routine of sales. One of the issues that drew my attention were the differences between Chinese and foreign consumers. As long as foreign people showed their purchases to their friends saying how smart they were because they had acquired a perfect replica of a Rolex watch for a cheap price, Mainland Chinese consumers usually left the store saying "I bought a Rolex". An informant, owner of a toy factory,
explained to me his point of view about his Rolex watch: "Western people think this Rolex [he pointed at his wrist] is not a Rolex because is a replica. For us, this is a Rolex, a real one. The difference is the origin, because this was made in China, and for us, it's better to help national industry".
The informants showed that they were concerned with China interests, IPR seeming to be a problem for others. In fact, it was after China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, that negative public discourse began to emerge in the official media about the market for copies. However, this discourse has not become current among the population as a whole.
Thus, we find in China, a system that ascribes social legitimacy to what we deem as informal labor activities and production based on copies. This provides an environment in which ties between officials and businessmen in this economic sector are strong, with both committed to the same development project, which is not necessarily linked to the ideals of economic practices established in the West, but primarily to the local rules of social relationships and cultivating life.
At least since the classic works of Max Weber (1968) and the Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1980), a vast amount of Chinese or foreign literature has shown that the cultivation of social connections is central to Chinese society. From the twentieth century on, in particular, the guanxi system of exchanges within social relationships has been considered supreme in social, economic and especially political life (Gold 1985; Gold et al. 2002; Hwang 1987; Jacobs 1979; Kipnis , e 1997 Smart 1993 Smart , 2002 Wank , 2000 Yan 1996 ).
In the post-Mao era, the importance of cultivating guanxi was addressed as a means to penetrate the business world. This phenomenon was called guanxixue (the art of guanxi), which could be expressed as guanxilogy. That is, it is the wisdom acquired to achieve and maintain good relationships with people in positions of power in order to derive benefits. However, what at first glance could be classified as a simple form of corruption, for the Chinese, is a strict system of etiquette, based on feelings, affection, interest, honor, harmony and balance. It is believed that some basis in the past must exist for forming relationships (place of origin, kinship, place of work or study) and this basis can generate a shared destiny throughout a lifetime. Guanxixue is the art of cultivating particular ties through attitudes and the offering of gifts (Yang 1994) .
When this cultural system of gift-giving is transposed to the world of business, it ends up generating intense links between State and market, and public and private life. Abiding by guanxi ceremonies and their complex etiquette, the circulation of gifts between officials and businessmen is not construed as bribery, since these exchanges occur over a long period of time, thereby placing business interests on the same level as sentiments arising from established relationships.
In Shenzhen, I attended numerous events of a relaxed social nature, such as banquets and karaoke, which unfolded between State officials and businessmen, in which there was a circle of gift exchanges, both material (drinks, teas and cigarettes) and immaterial (facilitating bureaucratic matters). On these occasions, it can be noted that a shift in power relations has taken place between these players. If during the times of the Cultural Revolution it was the authorities who doled out luxury items (such as cigarettes and cognac) in exchange for good productivity in the communes (Gold 1985; Oi 1985) , today, they distribute symbolic power in exchange for luxury items.
At one banquet I attended, a police officer, who had recently been given a rare tea set by an entrepreneur promised the donor that he was speeding up, among his peers in the party, the process to regularize one of his factories.
While the factory owner gave the gift to the policeman, he said to me: "look! Take a picture!". Smiling tat the camera, he complemented: "if you want to learn about Chinese culture, the first thing you have to know is that relationship is very important in China".
These events tend to corroborate Nee's point of view that power relations between these two axes (market and State) have been de-verticalized and are now more symmetrical, since entrepreneurship gained symbolic and economic capital with the opening up of Chinese economy (1989, 1992) .
This model unites economic actors and State agents through guanxi. It was strengthened during communism -appearing under the concept of "second economy" -and developed a new facet in the post-Mao era. Although theorists of transition (Nee 1989 (Nee , 1992 defend the idea that these strong ties will disappear with the rationalization of the market economy and, consequently, with the strengthening of the weak institutions (Guthrie 2002) ; other authors argue that guanxi is more important than ever (Bian 2002) . One might argue that ideal impersonal market conditions are unattainable in practice, guanxi continues central. (Wank e 2002 .
My argument follows this line of thought, in the belief that, at present, officials and businessmen are committed to the same (and singular) model of national development. In the Post-Mao era, entrepreneurship is no longer an enemy; on the contrary, it is an ally. The Chinese government, in turn, is much more interested in legitimizing this system rather than controlling itcontrary to Brazil's case. That is why guanxi in China continues to be so much stronger and legitimate than the favor in Brazil.
Brazil: informal economy as marginality
Over the decades, a strong and negative moral stigma has built up around low-budget market trade and the informal market in Brazil. The roots of this process are very old and go back to the historic relationship between informality and marginality.
Based on Western concepts of rational economic practices, Brazil's ideology concerning modernity has, for a long time, regarded the informal economy as an unfortunate survival from the past; a setback to national development. From this perspective, development requires the regularization and moralization of certain practices -which range from urban sanitation policies that occurred in the 19 th and 20 th centuries (Borba 1993; Carvalho 1999; Franco 1998; Monteiro 1992 Monteiro , 1995 Pesavento 1991 Pesavento , 1992 to recent actions for combating smuggling and piracy.
Contesting this perception, from the 1970s on, Brazilian social sciences began to criticize "dualistic reasoning", which divided the economy into opposite poles, between formal and informal, legal and illegal, and showed the so-called 'signs of underdevelopment' in the country were not a 'thing' or a 'bubble' that is distinct from modernization. Contrary to existing ways of thinking, some anthropologists and sociologists sought to demonstrate that the evolution of capitalism needed underdevelopment, in a relationship in which poverty is an indispensable pole that allows wealth to grow. Authors such as Oliveira (2003), Kowarick (1975 Kowarick ( , 1994 , Machado da Silva (1971 ), Oliven (1980 , among others, were of great importance for their analysis of "marginalization", showing that it was the byproduct of the transformation of capitalism and, in addition, that informal work promoted the circulation of income among low-income sectors of society, thereby feeding into the economy.
Thus, Latin American theorists, just as they assimilated the concept of informal economies, also criticized it, demonstrating that it was a precarious notion which, even though it might account for an economic reality of Latin America, was skewed by neoclassical economic principles, which separated public and private spheres, emotion from reason, interest from feeling, conceiving economic practices by means of ideal types that would supposedly lead toward rationalization and impersonality.
Currently, the issues in the academic field have become more complex.
We are not only dealing with low-budget local markets that need to be cleared from the streets, but also an informal, globalized and interconnected mar- My informants' identity of honest vendors was contrasted to non-registered street vendors who operated in adjacent areas. Despite the fact that both groups sold made in China copies and other commodities, registered street vendors used to say that they did not sell piracy, but only "good things". For them, "bad things" were sold by the others. Differently from the vendors in China -where informants proudly sell replicas, and have clear awareness of the origin of the articles they sell -my informants reproduced the media discourse, claiming that piracy was wrong. Thus, when they said that their products were genuine, they were not cheating, since they actually believed in the quality of the products they brought from wholesale stores of Paraguay (such as toys). With little or no knowledge of the supply chain beyond Paraguay, my informants did not recognize their products as copies, even though they knew that commodities did not come from the original factory.
In a hostile environment, street vendors felt "alone" in the world, lacking not only social legitimacy, but also legal support. This reinforced the importance of personal ties among a handful of colleagues, since the environment they worked in was seen as extremely competitive -which can be noted in the expression "market law: every man for himself ". The State was also seen as an enemy: an entity that only came on the scene to "suck" money from them in exchange for provisional and informal permission for their activities. Local and federal police were known as "leech worms". During an episode, in which I accompanied some merchants who were traveling to Paraguay to buy goods, the bus we were on was held up at gunpoint by four masked bandits who behaved with great cruelty. All the vendors' money was taken from them and we were held hostage for an hour.
What to me was a situation of horror, to them was commonplace. However, apart from considering the incident normal, what surprised me was the fact that they didn't want to report the crime to the police, because they considered the latter just as much "thieves" as the assailants. A street vendor, already accustomed to the violence of the assaults, told me she felt she couldn't go to the police, because she was someone who did "wrong" things (smuggling) from a legal point of view and, for this reason, she had no right to file complaints about anything.
Thus, not only in the street vendor marketplace where the ethnography was conducted, but also in Brazilian street markets in general, personal ties and reciprocity take place between peers -and not between vendors and the local authorities as in China -in an effort to guarantee some security in everyday life. Within this gift exchange circuit, neighboring vendors lend each other small change and credit card machines, bring back goods from trips or take care of each other's stall when they need to go to the bathroom, etc. Moreover, due to the fact that they engage in economic activities that are not subject to the laws that regulate the formal economy, vendors do not enjoy a series of social rights and labor benefits and protection offered to formal sector workers.
I observed cases where, in the absence of retirement pay, long-time vendors collected money to give a salary to the oldest ones who were no longer able to come to work, or extreme cases when colleagues joined forces to pay for a person's health care treatment or even the funeral of someone who died. When this gift exchange circle between colleagues is broken, the culprit will suffer be accused of ingratitude. The negative feeling provoked by non-reciprocity is deeply felt, especially in a context where personal relationships between peers are one of the only ways to sustain economic practices.
Ingratitude, in this context, is simply an indicator of the importance of bonds as a form of pragmatic and emotional support, for the development of an activity that, both State and society, consider both legally and morally inferior. 
Conclusions

